Attacking 'the resistance' in Gaza
Attacking 'the resistance' in Gaza
Analysis: Sunday's bombing in Gaza was the latest in years of challenges between Hamas and small Salafi groups which seek to challenge its monopoly of resistance.
5 min read
The aftermath of the attack on Sunday [Anadolu]
The vehicles of five prominent leaders of the Islamic Jihad group and Hamas' armed wing, the Qassam brigades, were blown up on Sunday in Gaza's Sheikh Radwan district.
A number of small bombs also hit security facilities throughout May and June, apparently in retaliation for attacks upon mosques frequented by Salafis, and the reported detention of members of Salafi organisations.
The culprits called themselves "Supporters of an Islamic State in Jerusalem", and attempted to build support through social media.
At the beginning of July, people purporting to be IS fighters in Aleppo - including a Gazan from Rafah - issued a video threatening to destroy Hamas, referring to Hamas as "tyrants" and accusing the movement of secularism.
Yet the bombing on Sunday was unusual, as it was aimed at empty cars - and no group claimed responsibility for the attack.
Multiple sources told al-Araby that, during Ramadan, a number of Salafis were arrested in Gaza with large amounts of money and remain imprisoned.
On Monday night, names and photos of seven of the suspected Sunday bombers were released.
Salafis have responded to the crackdown imposed since Sunday's attack by threatening to fire rockets at Israel.
"The results will be catastrophic, will benefit no one, and it will be Hamas who shoulders the responsibility," read a Monday statement from a Salafist group.
There has been some confusion whether the militants are associated with the Islamic State group, the flag of which was supposedly painted at the scene of the attacks on Sunday.
Israel and Egyptian media have frequently conflated Hamas and IS, accusing the former of helping the latter in Sinai.
Although the fact remains that Hamas is a totally separate entity, long opposed to "IS", the wider context of Hamas, whose military institutions and tightly controlled strip likely incubated the development of such attackers, is orth remembering when considering the recent development of militancy in Gaza.
Hamas hegemony
Before Hamas came into power in Gaza in 2007, there was what became known as "security anarchy" in the strip.
Kidnappings were frequently carried out - often in a disorganised manner - Salafi groups began to blossom and inter-clan fighting was common. Militants in Gaza operated with a certain degree of juridical power and independence, annoying many among the civilian population.
After Hamas was elected, it began to put an end to the chaos, training a strong police force and bringing militant groups of all organisations - including Islamic Jihad - largely under their control.
They were able to do this through a strong grass-roots base of support, strict discipline built along religious community lines - and also generous funding from their backers.
Salafi fights with Hamas have broken out occasionally ever since.
In 2009, a group thought to be affiliated with al-Qaeda attempted to declare an Islamic state in Rafah, and was attacked by Hamas - killing thirteen and injuring 85.
Many militants have also been detained for attempting to break Hamas-held ceasefires with Israel.
However, as well as the Hamas crack-down annoying those who benefitted from the "security anarchy" - clan power structures, and Hamas' political opponents - the authoritarian all-pervading power and paternalistic nature of Hamas in Gaza also started to frustrate young Palestinians whose memories are dominated by life under Hamas hegemony.
This includes a minority of secular-leaning young Gazans who feel personally constrained by Hamas policies, as well as blaming the group for Israel-imposed sanctions.
Some of this group reportedly look to Fatah leaders, such as Mohammad Dahlan, for remedying their grievances in Gaza.
However, Hamas has also been frustrating younger former al-Qassam fighters, who reportedly make up the majority of new Salafi groups - and have, for numerous reasons, developed grievances with the militant wing of Hamas.
Sources close to Qassam say that these grievances could be political - disagreement with the "hudna", or ceasefire, with Israel left many in Gaza feeling like a long and bloody war did not reap adequate rewards.
A number of small bombs also hit security facilities throughout May and June, apparently in retaliation for attacks upon mosques frequented by Salafis, and the reported detention of members of Salafi organisations.
The culprits called themselves "Supporters of an Islamic State in Jerusalem", and attempted to build support through social media.
At the beginning of July, people purporting to be IS fighters in Aleppo - including a Gazan from Rafah - issued a video threatening to destroy Hamas, referring to Hamas as "tyrants" and accusing the movement of secularism.
Yet the bombing on Sunday was unusual, as it was aimed at empty cars - and no group claimed responsibility for the attack.
Multiple sources told al-Araby that, during Ramadan, a number of Salafis were arrested in Gaza with large amounts of money and remain imprisoned.
On Monday night, names and photos of seven of the suspected Sunday bombers were released.
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The results will be catastrophic, will benefit no one, and it will be Hamas who shoulders the responsibility - Salafi statement threatening to shoot rockets into Israel |
Salafis have responded to the crackdown imposed since Sunday's attack by threatening to fire rockets at Israel.
"The results will be catastrophic, will benefit no one, and it will be Hamas who shoulders the responsibility," read a Monday statement from a Salafist group.
There has been some confusion whether the militants are associated with the Islamic State group, the flag of which was supposedly painted at the scene of the attacks on Sunday.
Israel and Egyptian media have frequently conflated Hamas and IS, accusing the former of helping the latter in Sinai.
Although the fact remains that Hamas is a totally separate entity, long opposed to "IS", the wider context of Hamas, whose military institutions and tightly controlled strip likely incubated the development of such attackers, is orth remembering when considering the recent development of militancy in Gaza.
Hamas hegemony
Before Hamas came into power in Gaza in 2007, there was what became known as "security anarchy" in the strip.
Kidnappings were frequently carried out - often in a disorganised manner - Salafi groups began to blossom and inter-clan fighting was common. Militants in Gaza operated with a certain degree of juridical power and independence, annoying many among the civilian population.
After Hamas was elected, it began to put an end to the chaos, training a strong police force and bringing militant groups of all organisations - including Islamic Jihad - largely under their control.
They were able to do this through a strong grass-roots base of support, strict discipline built along religious community lines - and also generous funding from their backers.
Salafi fights with Hamas have broken out occasionally ever since.
In 2009, a group thought to be affiliated with al-Qaeda attempted to declare an Islamic state in Rafah, and was attacked by Hamas - killing thirteen and injuring 85.
Many militants have also been detained for attempting to break Hamas-held ceasefires with Israel.
However, as well as the Hamas crack-down annoying those who benefitted from the "security anarchy" - clan power structures, and Hamas' political opponents - the authoritarian all-pervading power and paternalistic nature of Hamas in Gaza also started to frustrate young Palestinians whose memories are dominated by life under Hamas hegemony.
This includes a minority of secular-leaning young Gazans who feel personally constrained by Hamas policies, as well as blaming the group for Israel-imposed sanctions.
Some of this group reportedly look to Fatah leaders, such as Mohammad Dahlan, for remedying their grievances in Gaza.
| Read more: Mohammad Dahlan - the return of Gaza's gangster politico |
However, Hamas has also been frustrating younger former al-Qassam fighters, who reportedly make up the majority of new Salafi groups - and have, for numerous reasons, developed grievances with the militant wing of Hamas.
Sources close to Qassam say that these grievances could be political - disagreement with the "hudna", or ceasefire, with Israel left many in Gaza feeling like a long and bloody war did not reap adequate rewards.
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| Hamas' Qassam Brigades parade on the anniversary of the 2014 war [Anadolu] |
However, their grievances can also be due to practical matters.
Military leaders in Qassam can take home a good wage - reported estimates are up to $800 a month - while full-time tunnel workers are understood to earn around half that amount, reflecting the salaries of the police force in Gaza who have some overlap of personnel with Qassam.
However, many of al-Qassam's foot soldiers and reserve fighters take minimal salaries, and have little say in the running of the organisation.
Salafi groups are thought to operate in cells with many fewer people, with funds allocated per-operation rather than on a salary basis, so recruits can take a more predominant role in operations, as well as taking a higher cut.
Under the business-minded Hamas leadership, money enters Gaza, especially from the Gulf, with little auditing or monitoring, purportedly for reconstruction after the war.
However, without anti-corruption measures, adequate infrastructure to carry out reconstruction, and the informality and unrecorded nature of the transfer of funds, it is easy for money to fall into the hands of militants.
Additionally, Qassam imposes a strict social moral code on their members - who can be thrown out for transgressions in their personal life. Such rejection can lead them into the hands of more extreme groups, as an alternative outlet.
In the years following their election to Gaza, Hamas transformed from a resistance group in opposition to an institution in power; its growing "institutionalism" might yet be evidenced by political leader's Khaled Meshaal's rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.
Ultimately the situation in Gaza is extremely fluid, and, in some comparisons with opposition fighters in Syria, militants and members of organisations change allegiances depending on practicality rather than ideology.
This "fluidity" of militant groups, as well as the recently abundant flow of cash into Gaza is precisely what fuels so many theories about incidents such as the bombings on Sunday, which are likely to gain more attention the more times the words "Islamic State" are mentioned.
