Chemical weapons in Sudan and the 'responsibility to protect'

Powerful nations are losing sight of what the responsibility to protect (R2P) really means, as it is often equated with military intervention. But obligations under this principle are much wider, and Sudan is one example that exposes western hypocrisy and its manipulation of R2P.

After years of slumber on Sudan's plight, something has awoken the beast. Amnesty International waved a file filled with evidence of how President Omar al-Bashir has been using chemical weapons in a merciless military offensive on Jebel Marra, a remote area near Darfur.

The horror of these attacks and response required, could be summed up in Tirana Hassan's own words, the Director of Crisis Research at the human rights organisation.

"The scale and brutality of these attacks is hard to put into words. The images and videos we have seen in the course of our research are truly shocking; in one a young child is screaming with pain before dying; many photos show young children covered in lesions and blisters. Some were unable to breathe and vomiting blood."

"It is hard to exaggerate just how cruel the effects of these chemicals are when they come into contact with the human body. Chemical weapons have been banned for decades in recognition of the fact that the level of suffering they cause can never be justified. The fact that Sudan's government is now repeatedly using them against their own people simply cannot be ignored and demands action."

A not so distant past

Darfur may be etched into memory for some. From 2003, a haunting humanitarian crisis was picked up on and declared by the UN to be the worst the world had ever seen.

The responsibility of protection is not so easy a principle to stand by

It led to a marathon of appeals and massive fundraising initiatives to help relieve the suffering of 1.2 million people who had been displaced by massacres that occurred before the country was split. In 2011, the Republic of South Sudan gained independence from Sudan, that was ruled over by Bashir.

Darfur witnessed fighting between the rebels and pro-government militias, which led to two million deaths. But Bashir was indicted for his crimes against his own people and an arrest warrant was put out for the dictator - twice.

The hype around Darfur died down but the fighting didn't and neither did displacement, famine or human rights violations.

The Responsibility to Protect (R2P)

David Miliband, then Foreign Secretary, did lean towards intervention:

"Too many times, in the aftermath of mass atrocities, we've promised 'never again'.

But in a world where so many states remain wedded to the principle of non-interference and the primacy of sovereignty, how do we make the responsibility to protect a reality, not a slogan?"

He was referring to the legacies and the stigmas of intervention in Kosovo and non-intervention in Rwanda. Praised for the former and condemned for the latter, these examples show that the responsibility of protection is not so easy a principle to stand by - it fundamentally means disrupting a country’s sovereignty or at least it does as the last resort.

Because R2P has three pillars:

1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement;

2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility;

3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a state is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

This takes the issue from sovereign action, through bilateral diplomacy to collective action. However, collective active still does not mean military action. Sanctions, for example, are one way that collective action can be taken, and intervention can be a contribution of troops to peacekeeping forces to protect civilian areas. Both have been seen in Sudan.

A good deed, tainted

Some commentators claim that our appetite to intervene has become curbed because of the disastrous consequences of Iraq around the same time as the Darfur crisis in 2003. This ignores the not insignificant detail that Iraq's intervention was nothing to do with R2P but was an illegal war, vindicated by the Chilcot Inquiry.

Another conflation between self-serving military intervention and R2P was seen when NATO decided to invade Libya in 2011. Then Prime Minister, David Cameron, argued his case to Parliament stating:

"Gaddafi has had every conceivable opportunity to stop massacring his own people and the time for red lines, threats and last chances is over. Tough action is needed now to ensure that people in Libya can lead their lives without fear and with access to the basic needs of life. That is what the [UN] Security Council requires, that is what we are seeking to deliver."

The alternative is that Bashir has now become a useful strategic ally to the West

Except, an Amnesty International report at the time noted that there was no evidence of massacres taking place and recently this has been vindicated by the recent parliamentary report that examined the decision-making behind intervention in Libya.

In short the report found that "the government failed to identify that the threat to civilians was overstated... By the summer of 2011, the limited intervention to protect civilians had drifted into an opportunist policy of regime change." Something NATO countries wanted all along it has been argued.

Now in Syria, the same question can be asked as to why we are there and what impact we can have protecting civilians through military action?

The case for Sudan

Based on our so-called track record of intervening to protect civilians, should we not be going in to Sudan about now? This is of course, not a good idea, no-one has suggested it to be so, and the allegations of chemical weapons must be further investigated through the UN. But what else are we doing in the name of our responsibility to protect in Sudan?

South Sudan, which is perpetually on the brink of civil war, has had a large UN peacekeeping operation since 2011. Bashir, an internationally wanted man, has seemingly got off scot-free.

The principles of R2P have now been relegated to the toolbox of useful aids of political manipulation

The Foreign Office have pointed to the need for Sudan to protect its civilians - pillar 1; and supposedly the US, the UK and the Troika, three western nations involved in a process to see a roadmap to peace, have diplomatically urged protection amongst fighting in and around Darfur, the areas of the South Cordofan and Blue Nile - Pillar 2.

But has Bashir been listening? He unilaterally declared the war was over in Darfur in early September 2016, which was ridiculed on social media, and then evidence has been produced by Amnesty International of horrific and illegal tactics.

And financial sanctions that were imposed by the UN by resolution have been lifted when in fact they should be tightening. This is one form of collective action that - if it was about protection of civilians - could be used to place pressure on Bashir to halt the fighting.

The alternative is that Bashir has now become a useful strategic ally to the West. Slowly appearing to cut himself away from Islamist groups, he is gaining key ties to Gulf countries such as the UAE and Saudi Arabia, also western allies, and providing useful intelligence to the US. Why rock the boat?

The principles of R2P have now been relegated to the toolbox of useful aids of political manipulation. They can be taken out to mobilise public sentiment among the less cynical for a cause that suits the government of the day.

Were this not the case, we would be actioning Amnesty International's calls for more political pressure to be applied on Bashir's government, to allow peacekeeping forces in to Jebel Marra and other areas affected by the fighting to monitor and protect civilians.


Sophia Akram is a researcher and communications professional with a special interest in human rights particularly across the Middle East. Follow her on Twitter: @mssophiaakram

Opinions expressed in this article remain those of the author and do not necessarily represent those of The New Arab, its editorial board or staff.